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oilcanboyd
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Thu Oct 27, 2005 9:17 pm |
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Joined: Tue Apr 26, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 39 Location: pigging through the pipeline
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[QUOTE]Technical papers are a stupid way to do analysis because they just deal with the problems"
Funny you should mention this. I am currently working on a technical paper on produced water separation and the in-efficiencies. Produced water is the water needed to push the oil out of the ground.
Hey its contraversy- there is no doubt we are running out of oil period. But when water cuts go up alarms go off and steep resevoir output declines. fractured rock and all IF Gahwars 120 by 36 mile underground tank is half empty we need to push the Gov'mnts of the world to look at it.
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bobbyboy
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Fri Oct 28, 2005 2:55 am |
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Joined: Sun May 16, 2004 12:00 am Posts: 74
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rockdoc123 wrote: Where is your reference for this? You link to a model study that does not deal with real rock (what kind of Middle East rock is this…in fact it looks closer to the Asmari to me and not the Arab)….. the most important reservoir parameter in this type of study is matrix permeability…the example they use seems mostly in the tens of millidarcies with a peak into the hundred plus range where in Ghawar the average matrix perm is in the 300’s getting up to 600 in the Ain Dur area...... Reservoir models are great things but they are not very reliable unless they are ground-truthed with the real thing. rockdoc123 wrote: Well this must mean you have access to a whole bunch of wireline logs and core data from Ghawar! Please provide us with your plots to justify your downgrades in reservoir thickness..... If you want to reduce recoverable reserves due to poorer permeability in certain zones that is fine….I still would like to see the evidence. I offer you the miraculous super-k zone that has produced the majority of Ghawar's cumulative production: Quote: At least five distinct types of dolomite occur in the Arab-D Reservoir in Ghawar field, Saudi Arabia – one of which appears to be responsible for high flow or ‘super-k’. Quote: • a finely-crystalline non-fabric-preserving (NFP) variety of dolomite in the lower Arab-D (Zone 3) with low oxygen isotope values and generally poor reservoir quality; • a medium-crystalline NFP dolomite with high oxygen isotope values and very poor reservoir quality in the upper Arab-D (Zone 2); • a medium to coarsely-crystalline NFP dolomite with low oxygen isotopic values and very good reservoir quality (‘super-k’) occurring in Zone 2; and • a finely-crystalline fabric-preserving (FP) dolomite in the uppermost Arab-D (Zone 1) that contains high oxygen isotope values and has generally fair to poor reservoir quality. Quote: This study also quantified and mapped the abundance and distribution of dolomite across the field, using all available core and log data. Quote: We interpret these linear patterns to have formed in response to a series of fracturing and/or faulting events that allowed dolomitizing fluids to move up into the reservoir from below, and preferentially dolomitize there. Quote: At times, dolomite is responsible for producing zones of very high flow (‘super-k’) in the reservoir, while at other times these rocks act as permeability barriers or baffles. Quote: Overall dolomite comprises approximately 14 percent of the Arab-D in Ghawar http://www.myfilehut.com/userfiles/15798/Dolomitetable1.GIFQuote: • On a Ghawar-wide basis, dolomitization appears to increase systematically from north to south in Zones 2A and 2B, but Zone 3A displays an inverse trend by generally decreasing from north to south (Figure 10). http://www.myfilehut.com/userfiles/15798/Dolomite3d1.GIFQuote: In the Haradh area, these high flow ‘spikes’ only occurred at three stratigraphic locations within the reservoir interval: (1) predominantly in a dolomite (low porosity) interval in the upper and middle portions of Zone 2B; (2) in a limestone at the base of Zone 2B; (3) and very rarely in a high porosity limestone grainstone in Zone 2A. http://www.myfilehut.com/userfiles/15798/Dolomitemap1.GIFhttp://www.myfilehut.com/userfiles/15798/Dolomitemap2.GIFhttp://www.myfilehut.com/userfiles/15798/Haradh1.GIFQuote: flowmeter data indicates that most of the flow (about 60%) in the Arab-D in Haradh is contributed by the highly dolomitized Zone 2B reservoir interval (Figure 20). Further, when the map of flow percent for Zone 2B is compared to the Zone 2B dolomite map, a very striking relationship can be seen between high dolomite and high flow in this zone (Figure 21). Analysis of map patterns seen in these two maps indicates that high flow typically corresponds to intervals of high dolomite, and low flow corresponds to intervals of low dolomite. This high degree of correlation between dolomite and flow percent map patterns suggests that, in Haradh Zone 2B (which contributes most of the flow in the Arab-D in this part of Ghawar), high flow occurs preferentially in areas that contain abnormally high amounts of dolomite. Conversely, where dolomite is relatively insignificant in this zone, high flow intervals are rare. http://www.myfilehut.com/userfiles/15798/Haradh2.GIFQuote: CONCLUSIONS 1. Not all dolomite in the Arab-D is the same. There are at least five different types of dolomite present, of which one variety, the Zone 2 ‘super-k’ NFP dolomite, appears to be responsible for high flow or ‘super-k’ intervals in the reservoir. This study documented the geochemical ‘fingerprint’ of this type of dolomite for the first time. 2. Mapping of the dolomite content of the Arab-D across Ghawar revealed that dolomite does not occur randomly or uniformly across the field. Dolomite occurs as linear NE-oriented belts of high dolomite content across Ghawar. 3. These areas of high dolomite are important: they tend to be the areas where overall high flow occurs and where super-k ‘spikes’ predominate. Aramco Geologist and coCan you see the light yet? rockdoc123 wrote: I would certainly like to know where you get your recovery factors from. The Aramco presentation talks about depletion, which relates to the amount of the URR that has already been produced, not the ultimate recovery factor. Perhaps you can explain to us the details of how Abqaiq is different from Shaybah, Khurais, Manifa etc ? From my own reading on the subject there are many similarities but also some differences. One of these differences (Shaybah is ultra light Arab which gives it the essential viscosity of refined diesel) should actually improve the recovey factor compared to parts of Ghawar where you are looking at medium to light Arab. Abqaiq like Ghawar had "super-k" zones as explained above. The others do not. That is essentially the basis of the Saudi oil miracle. Shaybah is being produced with similiar technology to Yibal from the beginning that is why I give such a low recovery factor (2.4/16 =15%) as horizontal MRCs will give steep decline rates. Khurais has to date produced at a peak of 144kbd in 1981. Aramco's belief that they can obtain 1.2mbd by 2009 seems to be pure fantasy based on previous production history. Twilight in the Desert: Quote: "In 1981, . . . Khurais produced a record 144,000 barrels a day. This was likely Khurais' all-time peak output. . . . Given the large number of wells drilled throughout the Khurais field and the erratic production history in the 1970s and 1980s, some people at Aramco must have had second thoughts [about developing this field]. . . . The fact that Aramco announced that this project was almost ready to proceed, only to quickly reverse itself and question whether a major expansion would actually go ahead, seems to signal the serious nature of the difficulties and challenges the Khurais expansion faces." (pages 213-215) It could produce 300kbd if everything goes right however considering the field is bring completely reworked (heavy fracturing etc) and the use of horizontal wells that shut off and the heavy level of water injection it will suffer a similar steep decline rate. The 1.2mbd figure would probably refer to total liquids production (0.9mbd brine/300kbd oil): Quote: "It seems a growing number of analysts are falling into line with the Simmons & Company International view that Saudi Arabia may be running out of steam and may not be able to perform the role of global swing producer for many more years, despite being credited with oil reserves in the order of 260 billion barrels. The Centre for Global Energy Studies hinted at the beginning of the year that the kingdom appeared to be heading for difficulties. Now one of its analysts has said that having reserves does not equate to production capacity. Citing the Haradh field, he said it required 500,000 barrels per day of water injection to get out 300,000 bpd of oil. Moreover the problem is even more serious in the Khurais field." "Doubts grow about Saudi As Global Swing Producer," Aberdeen Press & Journal Energy, April 5, 2004, p. 15 Energy BulletinManifa is different. Its crude is mixed with other blends due to the high levels of vandium, hydrogen sulfide etc from the heavy sour crude. There is certainly a reasonable amount of oil there. Wood Mackenzie give URR of 4 billion barrels so giving a RF of 33% assuming OOIP of 12 billion barrels. rockdoc123 wrote: Quote: Meaningless? You consider someone who is the chief reservoir engineer for Chevron going under oath against his peers stating that their collective behaviour had been damaging the Saudi reservoirs when everybody else denied it to have no meaning . That sort of whistleblower behaviour is not common, it would have been far easier for him to have gone along with the group yet he had the guts and a conscious to tell the truth. First off the reason I said it was meaningless to this discussion is his testimony was well in advance of when they observed the water flood breakthrough, as shown in the curve and as noted in a few of the SPE papers. At that point in time he had no idea of what damage might or might not have been created . Also if you have ever worked in this industry the one thing you will realize is that there are always people with an axe to grind. This is what is called heresay evidence. You of course got this from Simmon's book....I don't remember any hard evidence being produced at that hearing? No hearsay is more like this: Quote: But this year at the Offshore Technology Conference some were talking about a 55% water cut for Ghawar Energy Bulletinand this: Quote: Engineers who have personally worked Ghawar tell me that their reservoir models show a catastrophic decline in production by 2008-2009. MortonSome context. Simmons: Quote: Its a fascinating and tragic story that should have been a big deal back in 1974 and in 79. Ironically I uncovered two bits of information that I had mentioned in the book. The first was a little story that was published in early 79 in the New York Times by Seymour Hersh that described the secret 1974 Senate hearings when behind closed doors the Senators were told that the Saudi Arabian oil fields were being intentionally overproduced and they were going to have to cut back anyway so even if there hadn't been an embargo there would have been a necessity to cut back the oil. And because the report said they were secret hearings I had assumed therefore there wasn't any more information and it was just an interesting piece of data. And also because it was only about three paragraphs long I dealt with this in the book until I found the real story, its just isn't this interesting that there was at least one suggestion that maybe not all was well as far back as thirty years ago. Then I also had mention of the executive summary of a staff report to the Senate subcommittee on foreign relations in April 1979 and all I had was two pages of the executive summary of this and it indicated that they has just written down a lot of proven reserves and they had significantly changed their mind about what was sustainable peak production going down from 20-25 million barels/day down to maybe 9.8 million barrels/day. And I couldn't understand where this even came from and the person that sent it to me said "I couldn't remember where I got this, it was just in my files". As I had finished the book and my assistant was going back and making sure we had proper documentation for everything that we had quoted she called the Senate librarian to see if whether there was anyway we could get a full copy of this staff report. The Senate librarian said "you know we don't keep staff reports, we would have to have a library bigger than the Pentagon, but you might check with your local university, often times they have this". And it turns out we have one of our part-time employees whose going to school at night at Univeristy of Houston. In the library of the University of Houston was the 33 page staff report to the subcommitte of multinational corporations of the Senate committee on foreign relations. When I read through this it also refered to the 74 hearings and it gave the reference number. Interestingly enough I'd been told that the 74 hearings by one of the investigative reporters at the New York Times said "you know what ever that got they put under lock and seal for fifty years" and I thought wouldn't it be ironic if enough time had pasted maybe that information is available. Well it turns out that I got a friend on Capitol Hill to go over to the library of Congress and check out the two volumes that were all the subpoenaed papers; the hearings themselves and all the subpoenaed papars from the 74 hearings. They were secret hearings but they actually decided because of the inconclusive nature of what they discussed to go ahead and put all the papers that they subpoenaed as a matter of public record and I suspect I'm probably the only person that ever checked those books out. And the backgound of the 74 hearings was absolutely amazing. In January 74 when we were at the height of the oil shocks, Jack Anderson in the Washington Post published three or four back to back stories saying that he was in possession of secret papers that came from someone from within the Aramco companies. The Aramco companies then were basically Exxon, Chevron, Mobil and Texaco. They had basically intentionally convinced Saudi Arabia that these fields had no limit to which they could be produced and their strategy was to produce every drop of oil they could get out of these fields before it was inevitable that they were going to get nationalised. And as they did this they run into massive production problems of water encroachment and reservoir pressure dropped and so they were getting ready to dramatically cut back their production to prevent a production collapse when the embargo happened. So once Anderson published these three or four Washington Post articles there had been a subcommittee created by the committee on foreign relations to study multinational corporations, they has just finished a big investigantion of AT&T and the Allende government in Chile. So they asked Jack Anderson to come in and describe to them in a closed hearing what was going on. It was so fascinating to read this. This was January 28th 1974 Anderson asked to be sworn in and he begins his testimony saying "I asked to be sworn in because Aramco is already saying I was making this stuff up". And he tells chapter and verse about the whistleblower giving him these documents cos he thought they were operating against the best interests of the United States and the world. The Senators were so shocked and he wouldn't disclose at all who his sources of information was deja vu today, so they subpoena docmentation from the four owners and then they hold additional hearings. And finally on June 20th they have about 6 executives from Exxon and Chevron testify under oath and one of the exectives testifies is the chief reservoir engineer at Chevron "Yes these are massive problems we were going to have to cut back we could not sustain this production" and the others under oath say "no there are no problems what so ever". Now that I have the chance and go back and read the subpoenaed papers that were all there it is absolutely clear people knew at the time that they could never sustain these rates of production. And then in 1979 this is still a little bit murky but I have now found enough people that were involved that I think I've pieced together the story. First of all Seymour Hersh publishes this article in the New York Times about the 74 hearings thats the first time there has ever been any dislclosure about the 74 hearings and the story behind that is that he wanted to do an enormous story about this and the editors of the New York Times said " Sey have you ever been to Saudi Arabia? What do you know about this?" and I'm told by one of his colleagues that he said "no I've never been to Saudi Arabia but actually I never went to My Lai either" the Vietnam scandal he disclosured. But they cut it back to three paragraphs. About the same time Iran had totally collapsed by then and the government was notified that Aramco was going to cut their production back by a million barrels/day and that triggered Frank Church who had been Chairman of the subcommittee in 74 and he is now Chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations to an intense curiousity is this a political act? Or could these be these problems that we were warned about five years ago?. So they issue subpoenas again and collect a bunch of data and whatever they collected was so sensitive that it was put under lock and seal for fifty years and they had a big debate as to what to release and they finally decided to produce a fuzzily written 33 page staff report to the Senate subcommittee so they could properly document that there were problems. What is interesting is the reason it faded away in June 1974 was the inconclusive nature; was one guy right and the others seven or eight wrong and by the end we had actually forgotten about our energy crisis. It was over and we right at the height of Watergate and when all the papers were released to the public domain it was the 10th August 1974, you know what else was going on that week; that was the week Nixon resigned. (my transcript of the first part of the interview) EV World Interviewrockdoc123 wrote: I am afraid you are dead wrong there. Sorry meant to write vertical. Simmons: Quote: Here's their water cut of all of Ghawar. They were basically very proud in February to say that it rose to a peak of 36.5 percent in '99 and now we've got it under control. The reason they've got it under control is that 1999 is when they stopped drilling vertical wells in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The vertical wells were too close to the water and they were watering up in about 30-40 days. So this is a temporary reprieve, in my opinion. Hudson Institute Transcriptrockdoc123 wrote: And if you know of any field that actually reports water cuts from wells that are not producing I think we would all like to hear about it…..by definition they have no water cut because they are not producing….duh. Shutting in wells with excessive water production is all part of reservoir management. No disagreement. rockdoc123 wrote: OK …lets get this right once and for all. The depeletion figures noted in the Aramco slide relate to the amount of recoverable oil that has been produced to date. So in the example of Ghawar total 48% depletion means the recoverable reserves are 115 GB, not the OOIP. In terms of reconciling this with the various Aramco statements….the 2P reserves they carried in 1997 according to IHS Energy were 114 GB…..the 2P was subsequently upgraded in 2003 to 140 GB. So the Aramco presentation would make sense if indeed they had simply moved probable reserves into the proven category and possible reserves into the probable category from 1997-2003. This doesn’t seem that unusual given the size of the field and the fact they were building lots of gas/oil/water separation plants, drilling horizontal wells and doing other technics to recover stranded oil. In regards to Shaybah the production profile indicates you are correct about the total production to end 2003 (about .985 GB) but the depletion factor of 5% relates to URR. As a consequence the recoverable reserve ends up being 19.7 GB. According to HIS Energy as of May 2004 the 2P reserves for Shaybah were 21 GB and the proven reserves were 20 GB. This seems to match. So from what I can see you are still confused by the concepts of OOIP and URR. Glad you say I'm correct on this. The 18 figure refers to Aramco not IHS should have meant that. I am not confused IHS numbers are incorrect as they are politically derived see below. rockdoc123 wrote: That is just silly. I have worked for several companies that buy IHS energy products. If there was any inclination that the data was being cooked in any manner those various subscriptions (which in my current case amount to about $2MM/yr) would be immediately cancelled. Oil companies are the main clients of IHS ….it is not in their interests to have the concept out there that oil supply is limitless. If IHS was actually interested in appeasing their main clients they would be putting out low numbers not high ones. I have had dealings with this company since the late seventies when they were PetroConsultants….if anything they have considerable professional integrity. Errors that are present are not made on purpose. Petroconsultants may have been credible in the 1970s what I am refering to is IHS Energy today. Laherrere has this to say: Quote: It is obvious that IHS is now overestimating reserves, looking more to political data than to geological data.
ASPO Lisbon
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bobbyboy
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Fri Oct 28, 2005 7:25 am |
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Joined: Sun May 16, 2004 12:00 am Posts: 74
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rockdoc123 wrote: As you know I am a proponent of the Saudis publishing all of their supporting data.....but that ain't gonna happen. As such we are left with trying to figure out what is there through information that has been released in one manner or another. Your view that the Saudi view just has to do with "the Arab way" gets me a bit twisted off simply because I have many Arab friends who do not think in anyway different than most westerners.....notwithstanding that such a concept might apply to when they make statements such as "we have enough oil for a hundred years" but it doesn't apply to when they make specific statements on OOIP, proven and/or proven plus probable reserves...which they have made on numerous occassions. Let me clarify by telling you the following story. In 1933 oil exploration began in Saudi Arabia with significant discoveries beginning in 1940 when Abqaiq was found. Other giant fields were found in subsequent years (Ghawar in 1948, Safaniya in 1951 etc). Chevron (then Socal) was the owner and operator of these great fields later Exxon, Mobil and Texaco became partners of Aramco. In 1970 Saudi Arabia was producing 3.9mbd third in the world behind the US at 11.3mbd (just peaking) and USSR at 7.7mbd(Western Siberian fields were still to come onstream), total world oil production was 48.1mbd. Other significant producers were Iran 3.8mbd (peaked just four years later at 6.1mbd), Kuwait 3mbd (peaked in 1972 at 3.3mbd) and Venezuela 3.8mbd who peaked that year. These six made up 33.5/48.1 = 70% of world production. Production had never before and never since been concentrated in so few hands. In the following years both Saudi Arabia having been friendly with America since 1945 and Iran friendly since 1941 under the Shah were involved in a race to gain market share and establish themselves as the premier OPEC producer both in the process overproduced their fields despite knowledge of problems in this approach (SPE papers go backing to 1961 indicated water problems at Abqaiq). Simmons takes up the story: Quote: In January 74 when we were at the height of the oil shocks, Jack Anderson in the Washington Post published three or four back to back stories saying that he was in possession of secret papers that came from someone from within the Aramco companies. The Aramco companies then were basically Exxon, Chevron, Mobil and Texaco. They had basically intentionally convinced Saudi Arabia that these fields had no limit to which they could be produced and their strategy was to produce every drop of oil they could get out of these fields before it was inevitable that they were going to get nationalised. And as they did this they run into massive production problems of water encroachment and reservoir pressure dropped and so they were getting ready to dramatically cut back their production to prevent a production collapse when the embargo happened. So once Anderson published these three or four Washington Post articles there had been a subcommittee created by the committee on foreign relations to study multinational corporations, they has just finished a big investigantion of AT&T and the Allende government in Chile. So they asked Jack Anderson to come in and describe to them in a closed hearing what was going on. It was so fascinating to read this. This was January 28th 1974 Anderson asked to be sworn in and he begins his testimony saying "I asked to be sworn in because Aramco is already saying I was making this stuff up". And he tells chapter and verse about the whistleblower giving him these documents cos he thought they were operating against the best interests of the United States and the world. The Senators were so shocked and he wouldn't disclose at all who his sources of information was deja vu today, so they subpoena docmentation from the four owners and then they hold additional hearings. And finally on June 20th they have about 6 executives from Exxon and Chevron testify under oath and one of the exectives testifies is the chief reservoir engineer at Chevron "Yes these are massive problems we were going to have to cut back we could not sustain this production" and the others under oath say "no there are no problems what so ever". Now that I have the chance and go back and read the subpoenaed papers that were all there it is absolutely clear people knew at the time that they could never sustain these rates of production. Aramco was fully nationalised in 1980. Reserve and production data down to field by field figures were abolished, proven reserves were boosted immediately from 108 billion barrels to 160 billion barrels. Following a recently (in 2001) declassified 1977 CIA study of Soviet oil which predicted a peak in the early 1980s (the peak occured in 1987) America was set to destroy the USSR by hitting them financially. Reagan called up King Fahd and asked them to increase production from 3.5 mbd in 1985 to 10mbd in 1986 so as to depress the price, in return the Saudis got arms. It worked in just 3 months the price fell from $28 to $12. The Soviets system collapsed soon after as foreign debt payments exceeded their foreign exchange income making debt servicing a serious issue. Meanwhile as a result of the price collapse the other OPEC members were not too happy with the Saudi's behaviour and so formal production quotas were proposed for the first time related to reserves consequently previously rich nations that wanted a return to the glory days of the 1970s one after the other increased their reserves without any technical justification merely for political reasons, Lynch (yes him!): Quote: Unfortunately, national reserve figures are not very accurate and the 1980 revisions by the Gulf producers are highly suspicious [URL=http://www.peakoil.com/post168576.html#168576]Lynch Thread Quote: Campbell has made much of the suspicious reserve additions in the Middle East, thinking he 'discovered' it and that it's relevant. I was in Kuwait in 1987 and we laughed about it then. [/URL] Another ThreadThen came Saddam's annexing of Kuwait and Ghawar been overproducing (over 6.5mbd) as Iraq and Kuwait's oil was embargoed. A quick war and sanctions kept Saddam in check at the expense of the Iraqi people for the remainder of the decade. Throughout th 1990s the world economy boomed the atmosphere was reminscent of the roaring 20s as supplies gradually increased meeting demand and prices averaged just over $20/barrel. Then came 1998 and the Russian debt default, LTCM going bust with over $1 trillion in derivatives exposure, the dollar falling 18% in one day against the Yen, the Dow Jones Index recording its single largest one day points drop ever. The financial system was on the brink of collapse so LTCM was bailed out, interest rates slashed, liquidity flowed into the system leading to the final stages of the great technology bubble. Meanwhile oil dropped in just 7 months from $28 to $10 as speculators assuming OPEC had opened the floodgates bid the price down. They were wrong and OPEC reversed its position leading to an oil price spike from in 18 months from $10 to $32 (in euros it went from 9 to 42!  causing protests and fuel shortages). Meanwhile discoveries in the Caspian which were predicted to be another Saudi Arabia in size turned out to disappoint a handful of giant fields were discovered (Kashagan, Karachaganak etc) but it was not enough for some and IOC sell outs were common. Recession followed the oil price spike (as it often does) in the industrialised world. Then 9/11 happened and the military adventures began first in Afghanistan where the Taliban were stalling on a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. Then Iraq where no WMDs were found contrary to assertions. The Saudis knowing of a Iraq invasion were confident of increasing production to make up for the shortful unfortunately they has hit their limit, Deffeyes: Quote: However on March the 6th of this year 2003, a story came across the Dow-Jones news wire announcing from the Saudi Arabian government to Western oil companies and government's that the Saudi's would not be able to go beyond 9.2 million barrels a day and they were already producing that much. In effect, the Saudi's were max-ed out at this point. Deffeyes InterviewFortunately the invasion was swift as the Republican Guard put up little resistant and has instead reverted to guerilla warfare that has continued to this day supposedly under the leadership of Al-Zarqawi. Oil prices having spiked to $40 fell back top $28 at year end as the largest non-opec producer Russia was able to boost production by 11%. Next came 2004 and China finally after 26 years of continued economic growth began to assert its influence on the oil market boosting imports by 33% as its domestic production which had not been able to keep up with demand since 1993 finally peaked. Meanwhile both Russia and OPEC were running close to capacity for the first time in decades spare capacity finally went to nothing in August when the OPEC Secreatary-General came out in a state of shock at the situation before him uttering the following apocalyptic words: Quote: "The oil price is very high, it's crazy. There is no additional supply."
Guardian
The oil price set all time records for the next 16 consecutive trading days in response. Problems in Russia with Yukos meant that Russia peaked for the second time in September.Coupled with Iraqi pipeline attacks and hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico meant that global peak oil production occured in August 2004 at 81.5mbd never to be surpassed ever again; the end of the age of oil had began. Meanwhile the price hit the psychologically important $50 level in late September a level the Iranian oil executive Bakaktari had predicted earlier in the year. Having peaked the decline was masked by inaccurate data from official sources that showed an OPEC peak in October 2004 and a plateau since. Demand destruction began to occur in many poorer countries such as Zimbabwe, Yemen, Indonesia and Nigeria. China began to feel the effects as its oil imports stalled as refiners were discouraged by the government's capping of retail fuel prices. Then came the hurricanes named Katrina and Rita which caused prices to spike to $70 briefly before declining in the face of European and American strategic reserves flooding the market, normally this coupled with the record levels of short positions in the futures market would cause the price to collapse. In fact it held up well falling to just $59 at its low before beginning its run up to $100 in 2006 as one Australian professor has foreseen. The rest is but a mystery..........
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rockdoc123
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Fri Oct 28, 2005 9:19 am |
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Joined: Mon May 16, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 1955
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Bobbyboy...please quit paraphrasing huge chunks of Saudi history from Simmons book...we have all read it. Simply saying in one sentence that all of the Middle Eastern countries upped their reserves at the same time would avoid the history lesson that few of us really need. By the way it still does not dismiss the idea that there may have been good technical reason for upping those reserves....it is not necessarily the smoking gun.
Quote: Can you see the light yet? I know all about the super K zone, have read the GeoArabia paper you post from and several SPE papers and also have first hand experience with it elsewhere. Yes it creates issues with production but it has zero to do with in place reserves. There is still oil in the other parts of the Arab....by shutting off the high flow zones....drilling infills where it is not perforated etc. the lower perm zones ( and by lower perm we are still talking about several hundreds of millidarcies) can all be produced effectively, hence ultimate recovery is not affected. Not sure what you thought you were accomplishing here other than demonstrating you still do not understand the difference between inplace resource and recoverable reserve. Perhaps you had a point to make here but all you did was post from the paper. Highlighting the poor reservoir quality comments is also lost on me. So what ....the porosity for that zone would be taken into account in the reserve calculation.....it also demonstrates that your notion you should use a permeability cutoff is completely inappropriate.....A plot of permeability versus porosity for the Arab including Super K would be all over the map, you could not derive a proper transform. Quote: Abqaiq like Ghawar had "super-k" zones as explained above. The others do not. That is essentially the basis of the Saudi oil miracle. Shaybah is being produced with similiar technology to Yibal from the beginning that is why I give such a low recovery factor (2.4/16 =15%) as horizontal MRCs will give steep decline rates. Khurais has to date produced at a peak of 144kbd in 1981. Aramco's belief that they can obtain 1.2mbd by 2009 seems to be pure fantasy based on previous production history. Twilight in the Desert: So on the one hand you are arguing Super K is bad and then on the other it is good.....which is it? So it creates water by-passing that is going to destroy Ghawar but it did not in Abaiqiq?? A bit of special pleading I think. Please show me the reference for steep declines from MRCs. As well decline rate per well has zippo to do with ultimate recovery. If you saw the SPE presentation on MRC at Shaybah that Aramco gave they demonstrate the wells are drilled cheaper than previous horizontals.(meaning they can drill lots of infills)..they can be produced at lower drawdown and still achieve maximum flow. Khurais' production previously cannot be used as a model for what it will do now....especially given the fact they plan to develop it entirely with MRC. If you are inferring that MRC will cone bottom water faster...that is just stupid....the whole point of long reach horizontals is to decrease drawdown and achieve proper standoff. The only problems they have had with horizontals is where they have intersected fracture swarms....according to recent publications they think they understand where these fractures are and how to avoid them. And posting the whole story from Simmons on the testimony of the senior reservoir engineer still does nothing to argue against the point I made....his testimony was well before the effects of the water flood was recognized....he or no one else had any proof at that time they were doing damage by injecting. This was a long time ago....the Saudis have done considerable work since then with considerable technology as I already mentioned. Quote: Glad you say I'm correct on this. The 18 figure refers to Aramco not IHS should have meant that. I am not confused IHS numbers are incorrect as they are politically derived see below.
rockdoc123 wrote: That is just silly. I have worked for several companies that buy IHS energy products. If there was any inclination that the data was being cooked in any manner those various subscriptions (which in my current case amount to about $2MM/yr) would be immediately cancelled. Oil companies are the main clients of IHS ….it is not in their interests to have the concept out there that oil supply is limitless. If IHS was actually interested in appeasing their main clients they would be putting out low numbers not high ones. I have had dealings with this company since the late seventies when they were PetroConsultants….if anything they have considerable professional integrity. Errors that are present are not made on purpose.
Petroconsultants may have been credible in the 1970s what I am refering to is IHS Energy today. Laherrere has this to say:
Quote: It is obvious that IHS is now overestimating reserves, looking more to political data than to geological data Actually according to IHS you are incorrect on almost everything to do with reserves. The fact your recoverable numbers are almost the same as IHS in place numbers suggests either you are confused or you have good technical reason to drop the reserves in each...you have not demonstrated that here. All you have done is say...I think the Saudis are lying because Simmons and Campbell say so...as a consequence I take their in place numbers and use them as recoverable. Without demonstrating this is a plausible approach (and the Super K paper doesn't do that) you leave the door open to any yahoo to come along and say ....well I think Ghawar is only going to produce for 6 months more...or I think the reserves in Saudi are X amount. Doesn't get us anywhere. And as to using Laherre's comment to prove that IHS is political...give me a break. Because Laherrere says something we should all believe it? As I said I have direct experience with this company...they have no reason to be politically motivated.....telling their clients that oil is limitless is not something they want to hear as it would drive the price down if it were true. They make their living based on simply reporting information...that is what we want from them and that is what they have delivered pretty much everywhere I have used them. To be polite Laherre is full of it....this was his response to IHS pointing out his Petroconsultants database was twenty years out of date. Quote: and Saudi Arabia was well explored by Aramco before it was nationalised during the 70's. The only parts of SA not touched by 30 years of exploration by this company when it was in American hands was some land near the border with Iraq, a section of the empty quarter, and out into deepwater. I have to disagree with you on this. The Rub Al Khali was completely unexplored by the former Aramco. Making statements like this without backing them up with data is pretty hollow there are large undrilled areas and also areas where the pre-Khuff has not been penetrated. Stratigraphic plays have been completely ignored or found by accident (i.e. the Jauf on the flanks of Ghawar). It is safe to say that the big fields have been discovered but there is likely going to be a lot of 10 - 50 MMB pools yet to be found...a plot of cummulative field sizes illustrates that. As to deep water....the definiition of deep water as applied by the petroleum industry world wide is 400 m, ....most of the Arabian/Persian Gulf is in depths of 40 - 60 m and at it's deepest it is in 90m....we call this shallow water. The offshore is fairly well explored for oil potential but at some stage they will be chasing Khuff gas.......likely well in the future since they have all the gas they need currently. You make it sound like offshore exploration/development is difficult here....probably the cheapest offshore drilling and quickest tie in I am aware of. Quote: What the hell does this mean? Aramco is no longer a public company so they can report whatever they like in the way of reserves. All we need to know that SA is lying about their reserves is that after they upped them from c.170BB to c.260BB without any new discoveries to back this up they have produced around 45 BB's since yet their so-called reserves are still stuck at c.260 BB. What it means is that Aramco claim they are using the same methodology that major oil and gas companies use....the SPE/AAPG standards for oil and gas reserve calculations. And again you ignore the possibility that they may simply have started to report proven plus probable rather than just proven reserves or they may have moved possible to probable categories. This is not uncommon pretty much everywhere in the oil and gas business. The main difference is Western companies do it annually in order to report under SEC regulations and appease shareholders......Aramco does not have those issues. Again they may be fibbing but what you show is not proof of anything. Quote: On what evidence! Several technical papers by Aramco folks published in the SPE. It amazes me that you love to quote Simmons reading of the SPE papers in which he conveniently ignores the ones that argue they have the water production issues largely under control. You can't use SPE papers to support your argument and then dismiss them when someone else uses them to argue the opposing view. Quote: Let's see Simmon's spent years reserching this subject in a painstaking fashion, each point backed by reems and reems of verifiable sources. Whereas this guy whips together a puff piece on the back of an envelope denigrating Simmon's research without offering any new evidence at all for his assertions.
I think you give him a lot more credit than he deserves here. First of all it isn't like he had to dig through old library archives.....this stuff is mostly downloadable from the SPE library....the remainder is easily obtained from SPE and library exhange. Second off Simmons book is hardly a technical publication.....his method of not citing references (but putting a list of publications in an appendix) would guaranty Elsevier would never publish it. These guys make a relevant point....there are a bunch of SPE papers that Simmons ignored that argue the Saudis understand the problem and have it under control. If you want to debunk these guys then access those papers and critically review them.
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Typhoon
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Sat Oct 29, 2005 8:09 am |
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Joined: Tue Sep 27, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 176
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rockdoc123 wrote: By the way it still does not dismiss the idea that there may have been good technical reason for upping those reserves.
 Most of the technology that could increase those reserves wasn't available at the time. Besides, the reserve additions still can't be justified. Quote: As well decline rate per well has zippo to do with ultimate recovery. However, the decline rates will eventually be much higher than they would have been while achieving the same ultimate recovery. With vertical wells, Ghawar would have already collapsed. Just as the Senate staff report indicated, North Uthmaniyah probably would have declined by 1989, and Ain Dar and Shedgum by 1992-1994. First, Aramco mothballed or at least partially rested all of its oilfields in the 1980s. (Hawiyah and Haradh were mothballed; the whole section of Fazran through Uthmaniyah might have been producing, but at a much lower rate.) Secondly, the horizontal and MRC wells. Does the technology recover a greater percentage of the oil in place? In some cases, maybe a bit more. However, Ghawar has been living on borrowed time, and the decline rate will be very high when these MRC wells can't hide from water channeling any longer. The evidence is there that the oil column is almost gone in many parts of Ghawar and Abqaiq. Even Aramco itself claims that Ain Dar and Shedgum have depleted 50% of OOIP. It would be a miracle to get more than 60%-70% recovery in a heterogeneous carbonate reservoir, and that doesn't exclude tertiary recovery. North Uthmaniyah has already fallen off, and Aramco insiders claim that Ain Dar and Shedgum will do the same in 2008. Basically, I don't see any evidence to contradict Simmons' claims that the technology is creating a dangerous illusion. What additional proof do you need after seeing the North Sea, Russia, Oman, etc.? The 1979 concerns that are deemed "irrelevant" by Jarrell are probably spot-on. rockdoc123 wrote: The Rub Al Khali was completely unexplored by the former Aramco.
Shaybah was discovered in 1968, so the former Aramco was obviously exploring in the Rub Al Khali. Also, when we talk about Shaybah, keep in mind that it produces from the Shu'aiba formation, the same formation as Yibal. We all know what happened after high-technology wells were applied there.
In fact, at least some parts of Shaybah already have a 15% water cut. That doesn't seem too high, until you remember that Shaybah has only been producing for 7 years. Water problems only accelerate as a field ages.
In summary, rockdoc has a few good points. Indeed, bobbyboy can't claim to be able to estimate field-by-field reserves. However, bobbyboy has the correct idea. Saudi Arabia almost certainly won't be able to grow its sustainable capacity beyond 12 mb/d, and there is a good chance that they already peaked in 1981.
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Mesuge
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Post subject: Posted: Wed Nov 02, 2005 12:35 pm |
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Joined: Tue Nov 01, 2005 1:00 am Posts: 1009 Location: Euro high horse bastard on the run
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seahorse2 wrote: Just speculation, but in this big puzzle, with the leak of Plame, Simmons book, SA reportedly "repatriating" their assets, etc., it seems that the information is known and that it is not promising.
Well I think we need a super thread focusing on any signs of unusual repatriation of petrodolars that's a definitive sign of global meltdown aka recession and long depression if you are an optimist
So, far I've seen in the news these "bombs":
1. China Daily, an article about the right time to stop subsidizing america's debt. Calls for diversification into Euro bonds etc..
2. Norway started shuffling its post peak oil revenue based funds away from the US bond/stock market..
.. Saudis???
.
Anybody is welcomed to contribute..
(I'm not highjacking this great thread, we can move this debate elsewhere)
+
Warren Buffet and Bill Gates are openly hedging against $ past few years. They believe significant devaluation (20-30%) and higher interest rates are necessary..
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rockdoc123
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Wed Nov 02, 2005 2:23 pm |
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Joined: Mon May 16, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 1955
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Quote: Most of the technology that could increase those reserves wasn't available at the time. Besides, the reserve additions still can't be justified. that is basically incorrect. During the 80's there were advances in seismic, the advent of 3D etc. etc.....Aramco was at the forefront of applications. Notwithstanding that, as I point out there is a huge difference between reserves and resources and proven versus proven plus probable versus proven plus probable plus possible. We have no idea what sort of reserves they were reporting prior to the revision....if indeed it was just proven producing reserves it is completely possible that the number could be doubled by simply also reporting proven non-producing and probable reserves. This may not even have taken any additional drilling....just a change in how categories are reported. They might be playing a game but that is just supposition. Quote: However, the decline rates will eventually be much higher than they would have been while achieving the same ultimate recovery. That is ridiculous....the horizontal MRC wells are intersecting up to 5 km of reservoir....draining areas behind the water flood front that are isolated pods of unswept oil. Aramco notes they have directed the MRC wells away from fractures and high permebility zones where it is advantageous and towards these areas where the full field model suggests greater sweep efficiency can be maintained. Aramco claims ultimate recovery will actually increase simply due to the fact they can access areas they could not produce economically with vertical wells. Quote: Secondly, the horizontal and MRC wells. Does the technology recover a greater percentage of the oil in place? In some cases, maybe a bit more. However, Ghawar has been living on borrowed time, and the decline rate will be very high when these MRC wells can't hide from water channeling any longer. The evidence is there that the oil column is almost gone in many parts of Ghawar and Abqaiq. Even Aramco itself claims that Ain Dar and Shedgum have depleted 50% of OOIP. It would be a miracle to get more than 60%-70% recovery in a heterogeneous carbonate reservoir, and that doesn't exclude tertiary recovery. North Uthmaniyah has already fallen off, and Aramco insiders claim that Ain Dar and Shedgum will do the same in 2008. As I said because they can access areas that are unswept, because they can stay away from zones which cone water and because they can maintain lower drawdown rates and higher offtake the wells are much more economic. Hence ultimate recovery which in essence is determined by an economic cutoff (you won't drill infill wells if it is not economic to do so) will be larger. There are a number of SPE publications on the MRC wells which indicate exactly this notion. Water "channeling" as you refer to it has only been a problem in horizontal wells where they inadvertently intersected fractures. Aramco notes they are shutting off these higher permeability zones by mechanical and chemical means. And by the way who are these "insiders". I keep seeing this repeated here...I think it comes from either Simmons or Campbell. We have no idea of the validity of these comments..ie. what exactly was said and by who. There was someone posting in this thread earlier on who claims to be a consultant working for Aramco who notes there are no issues so maybe there are two camps of insiders? Also I would point out that the laboratory SCAL work done on core material from the Arab D in Ghawar and the Shuaiba in Shaybah note ultimate recoveries in the order of +60%. Here are a couple of interesting figures from an SPE paper: SPE 93439, Water Management in North Ain Dar, Saudi Arabia, Alhuthali et al, 2005   what stands out from these diagrams is that production wise the field is behaving itself quite well...the full field model (which is varified by well information) suggests a water flood that for likes like it is working. In terms of the Rub Al Khali there were approximately 15 - 20 wells drilled in an area of somewhere in excess of 350,000 square km (about half the size of Texas) prior to 1975. From 1980 to 2004 there has hardley been any exploration drilling in the area. As recently as 2002 small oil was discovered at Takman inside the areas that Saudi Arabia offered out to foreigners in the gas round and Aramco hopes that the foreign companies will discover more oil with their gas wells...oil which Aramco will own.. This is hardly much more than cursory exploration to date. Indeed Shaybah only classifies as being in the Rub as it sits at the start of the dune field. The area was explored early on due to it's proximity to the UAE border, the rest of the Rub Al Khali is for all intents and purposes unexplored. Quote: Also, when we talk about Shaybah, keep in mind that it produces from the Shu'aiba formation, the same formation as Yibal. We all know what happened after high-technology wells were applied there.
In fact, at least some parts of Shaybah already have a 15% water cut. That doesn't seem too high, until you remember that Shaybah has only been producing for 7 years. Water problems only accelerate as a field ages I think you need to get up to date on what is happening with the MRC well applications in Shaybah. The following are some good references SPE 88986, Sahybah 220, A MRC well and it's implication for developing tight-facies reservoirs, Saleri et al, 2005 SPE distinguished lecture series: MRC a new generation of wells for developing tight reservoir facies, Salamy, 2005 (you should be able to download this for free from SPE.org) As well as I noted above the SCAL work suggests 50 - 65% ultimate recoveries from Shuaiba cores taken from Shaybah. If they can manage the fracture network (they claim that planning for the location of the MRC is allowing them to do that) and continue to improve on drilling cost performance it should be achievable theoretically. Quote: However, bobbyboy has the correct idea. Saudi Arabia almost certainly won't be able to grow its sustainable capacity beyond 12 mb/d, and there is a good chance that they already peaked in 1981.
And I ask once more what is the evidence for this other than pure speculation? Which production profile shows a peak? The information Aramco is putting out in presentations suggests flat production from Ain Dur and Shedgun with a controlled water influx, they attest to be bringing back on several fields using the newer technologies (this is substantiated by press releases made by companies which have been hired for construction of facilities). Basically what I am trying to point out here is this whole idea that Saudi oil is in trouble or has peaked is not based on any hard information. Believe what you want but what I have read so far suggests they have a number of production issues to deal with (not unlike that we have to deal with everywhere) that they realize are there and have taken steps to ameliorate, most of which they claim have been successful. Fields that were previously shut-in due to high water or gas influx are being brought back on stream with the knowledge they have gained in their producing fields.
I continue to dig away at various sources....trying to piece together all of the information out there.
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0mar
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Wed Nov 02, 2005 2:31 pm |
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Joined: Tue Oct 12, 2004 12:00 am Posts: 1599 Location: Davis, California
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I've always held the assumption that Aramco has more responsibilities, not less, than any other major company in the world. If Aramco fucks up, the entire economy of SA comes crashing down.
_________________ Joseph Stalin
"It is enough that the people know there was an election. The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything. "
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GreyZone
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2005 2:39 pm |
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Joined: Sun Sep 25, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 115
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Interesting data from Bloomberg in that it expects Saudi production to more than double to 18.3 mbpd by 2030 (despite disagreements from al-Husseini recently on that very topic).
Of note those is this curious little statement:
Quote: Production this year may approach a record 10.7 million barrels a day, including light oils and the kingdom's share of output from the so-called Neutral Zone, a territory between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the IEA said. It will probably climb to 11.9 million a day in 2010. Why is this interesting? The projected number for 2010 previously was 12.5 mbpd. That's a 600,000 bpd shortfall. I am tending to believe al-Husseini that Saudi production will level off somewhere between 12-15mbpd and never approach 18, 20 or 25 mbpd that other Western estimates keep assuming will occur. Of course, if Simmons and Price (former head of Aramco Exploration) are both right, then even those numbers may never be reached or sustained for any important length of time. Also, even the IEA is expecting Ghawar to peak by 2015 and decline thereafter. Quote: Ghawar is currently producing 5.8 million barrels a day and that may climb to more than 6 million a day in 2010, the IEA says. Output would then peak by about the middle of the next decade, declining to about 3.7 million a day in 2030.
Over at The Oil Drum, this article is also under discussion. I highly recommend The Oil Drum as a site to read for good information about the oil industry.
Edit: There is also this fascinating article about Ghawar by G.R. Morton, who apparently does reservoir management these days.
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NEOPO
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2005 6:15 pm |
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Joined: Sun May 15, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 3997 Location: THE MATRIX
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Sorry - cant help myself.
Rockdoc - sorry to inform you but someone has already dug through the data and his name is Matt simmons!!
and
How much does SA pay people like yourself anyways??
Wow - is this a good time to present that SA article again??? Yes I think it is.....
Saudi Oil Is Secure and Plentiful, Say Officials
Thats a great article isnt it?? I mean really really great.....
Here - allow me to quote from it please....
WASHINGTON, 29 April 2004 — Officials from Saudi Arabia’s oil industry and the international petroleum organizations shocked a gathering of foreign policy experts in Washington yesterday with an announcement that the Kingdom’s previous estimate of 261 billion barrels of recoverable petroleum has now more than tripled, to 1.2 trillion barrels.
1.2 trillion!! woohoo - no worries matey's
Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s key oil and finance ministers assured the audience — which included US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan — that the Kingdom has the capability to quickly double its oil output and sustain such a production surge for as long as 50 years.
Wow this is better then a night at the IMPROV!!!
“Saudi Arabia now has 1.2 trillion barrels of estimated reserve. This estimate is very conservative. Our analysis gives us reason to be very optimistic. We are continuing to discover new resources, and we are using new technologies to extract even more oil from existing reserves,” the minister said.
Naimi said Saudi Arabia is committed to sustaining the average price of $25 per barrel set by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. He said prices should never increase to more than $28 or drop under $22.
BWAHAHAHAH thats good stuff - we should be contacting Naimi' agent ASAP as good comedians are in short supply.....
and this is what you base your position on???
A big bucket of sweet light bullshit???
I will pass.....
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Typhoon
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2005 7:13 pm |
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Joined: Tue Sep 27, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 176
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Al-Naimi was probably talking about OIIP, not proven reserves. Still, there is a major discrepancy between Al-Naimi's claim (1.2 trillion barrels) and the OIIP given in the presentation by Abdul-Baqi and Saleri last year (700 billion barrels).
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NEOPO
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production - trying to piece together the various Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2005 9:50 pm |
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Joined: Sun May 15, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 3997 Location: THE MATRIX
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I equate this to some government mule geologist stating that URR is not 2 or 3 trillion but rather 20 or 30 trillion.
Besides all their double talk - They had and still have reason to lie.
Its just baffling that otherwise smart and educated people choose to believe and attempt to justify this BS.
We will know soon enough - I just hope at that juncture we will be older and wiser yet for some reason I get the funny feeling we won't be 
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AirlinePilot
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production: Collecting the Data Posted: Wed Nov 09, 2005 11:23 am |
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Joined: Tue Apr 05, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 3501 Location: South of Atlanta
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I think what Rockdoc is doing is commendable. He obviuosly has a bit more knowledge of these things than most of us do. I have read Simmons book and several others on this topic. One thing I took away from these books was that it APPEARS something may be up. It SEEMS that there COULD be a problem looming in the not too distant future with regards to Saudi production.
While I'm not a blind follower of Simmons et al, I do tend to think that Saudi Oil production could be reaching a critical point with respect to geology. Rockdoc is trying to show us that there are two sides to every issue and with regards to Saudi production it's the same story.
He believes that its not as big a deal as some others do. It all comes down to credibility, and here Rockdoc has some with me. I'm searching for answers too and this helps guys like me who want to see both sides of the issues. We need to be very clear and smart about what is going on, blindly following hunches and bad science won't help anyone.
Thanks Rockdoc.
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killJOY
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production: Collecting the Data Posted: Thu Nov 10, 2005 4:26 am |
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Joined: Mon Feb 21, 2005 1:00 am Posts: 2417 Location: ^NNE^
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Quote: I think what Rockdoc is doing is commendable.
I have to disagree.
I've read his posts carefully. He is using language, highly technical language, in a way to intimidate and to obfuscate.
If I can read Simmons, Deffeyes, Campbell, et al., as a complete outsider and understand everything crystal-clearly, and then read "rockdoc" and come away saying, "WTF?", guess whose material I'm going to give more credibility?
_________________ "By the time individuals discover that remaining resources will not be adequate for the next generation, the next generation has already been born. " David Price
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syncline
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Post subject: Re: Saudi Production: Collecting the Data Posted: Thu Nov 10, 2005 5:42 am |
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Joined: Fri Sep 23, 2005 12:00 am Posts: 13
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This is the most interesting thread on the board!!
I'm not equipped to contribute directly to the argument about Saudi Arabia, or the question of how much of the world's oiil has been used, but there is one thing I do want to ask.
Surely it is obvious that the curve of oil extraction will be anything but symmetrical??? Oil remains the best source of energy even at $60/barrel. With a booming world economy, demand will increase. It doesn't matter what the cost is - $100, $200 - so long as it's still cheaper than the available alternatives. So extraction will continue to increase and Peak wll be delayed until the cost gets so high that real demand destruction bites, and that will only happen at very high prices indeed.
Rather than be a nice up-and-down shape, the curve will be like a breaking wave - steadily increasing, despite rapidly rising extraction costs, and falling, when it does fall, very quickly indeed.
Maybe we need to modify, at least mentally, that Peak Oil curve that has such a grip on our imaginations??
And given that, it seems less intrinsically unlikely that SA could be more than half way through its oil and be starting to strain at the practical limis of its capacity and facing a rapid fall.
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