We cannot drill our way out of this oil crisis. Since 2000, oil companies working in the U.S. have doubled the number of wells drilled per year.
Although increased drilling has added new oil to the nation's supply, it has not done so fast enough to offset the terminal decline of existing fields.
We are going to have to import more of our oil. Period.
Posted: Wed Dec 08, 2004 2:39 pm Post subject: Dieoff Model/Conservation Scenarios
To summarize, we have been working under the follwing set of base assumptions:
a. The increase in global population experienced this century coincided with and/or was dependent on the use of the abundance of fossil fuels that we have pumped in profusion since about 1930.
b. This supply will peak and begin to decline at some point.
c. As the supply of this abundant and efficient energy source disappears, it will have a direct negative impact on future population. (the “die off” per the Jay Hanson website).
d. If we have a plausible decline model, and historical data by which we can deduce the relationship between exploiting this energy source and population, we ought to be able to build a population model to forecast this dieoff, and understand when and how it will occur, and also, whether anything can or should be done about it.
If anyone has any disagreements with a-d above, please feel free to discuss it.
So, just for fun, we accumulated a lot of population data, oil production data, and built the base “dieoff model” on our Verhulst logistics-type curve which we developed earlier. The two assumptions we made were that the decline in oil production will more or less follow this curve (per Hubbert and others) and that it will occur pretty soon. There is substantial evidence supporting the first assumption, there is not a lot of general agreement on the second assumption but frankly, based on all of this fun to date, I do not think it makes too much difference if it occurs now or in 2020. If you want to believe 2020, move everything in this post back 15 years and the conclusion is the same or worse.
The interesting thing we found out was that as oil consumption increased, birth rate actually declined, no doubt due to people being better educated, etc. and also, that as oil consumption increased, life expectancy greatly increased (nearly doubled), thus the increase in overall population could either be attributed to more old-timers around than there used to be in the pre-oil days, or else infant mortality being lower, allowing more people to grow up. Khebab correctly pointed out that there may be no direct causality for this, but I think sufficient circumstantial evidence so that we can pretty much believe it. Anyone that disagrees with this point may feel free to show data and other sources that this is not the case.
So based on all of this, we constructed the first base model, which came to the following conclusion:
a. If the “peak” occurs today, and the same relationships between oil production and population hold for the future the same way it did in the past, the following scenario will play out: The global population will peak at about 7.2 billion in about 2030, after which time there will be a great decline. Using the model we used, this decline will be approximately 1.14 billion people over 40 years, making the population in 2070 just about what it is right now. If this scenario plays itself out, the remaining global oil reserves will give out sometime between 2080 and 2090, and the population at 2100 will be approximately 4.4 billion, which will have to survive on no oil.
b. We ran through a couple of silly scenarios about the rate at which this dieoff might occur and various events that might speed this along, and allow the survivors to live at some slightly higher standard of living (in light of the impact on oil consumption and living standards), but pretty much everything we could think of, including the four horsemen themselves, would have resulted in no better scenario by the year 2100.
So, this being the case, the next question is, could any amount of conservation and/or reduction in usage, things being what they are, result in any different outcome? So, I’ve built a couple more scenarios for the purpose of generating further discussion by the forum to explore this question.
a. The first alternate case is the “Uppsala Protocol”, proposed by ASPO, and described cryptically on the website peakoil.net. The essence of it is, if I understand it correctly, everyone in the world agrees that extraction will be voluntarily adjusted so as to have it be no more than the previous year’s depletion rate. Example: We estimate the ultimate global reserves as 1300 gb, and last year pumped 28 gb. (2.2%) therefore next year’s production will not be allowed to exceed (1300-28.00)*2.2% whatever that is. If we get lucky some year, we might find some more oil, and increase the reserves, therefore be able to pump a little more for a few years. There is one minor problem with this method (in addition to enforcement), people have to have an agreed-to standard about what a “reserve” is, and agree to be honest for a change, and admit when they are starting to deplete. Example: Saudi Arabia is claiming that due to “reserves growth” they had the same reserves at the end of 2002 that they did in 2003, despite a full year’s happy pumping, but will not allow any verification, etc. For the purposes of this model, I assumed that there was a 1300 gb remaining supply, with “discoveries” lumped into the 1300 gb, and that net “reserves growth” will net out to “zero” unless proven otherwise.
So, what was the outcome? Well, for the first couple of years there was really not much difference between the Uppsala model and the regular “current path” decline curve, but about 10 years out, there is a 1-2 gb reduction in pumping. For example, in 2030, the Uppsala Protocol model allows pumping of about 15.7 gb, compared to the “current path” of about 19 gb. The result of this is that the remaining reserves at the end of the curve will last 20-30 years longer than normal (borrowing slightly from medium-term production to add on to the end). The population effects are not that different from the current path: a smaller population peak (6.9 billion in 2030) but a more rapid decline (1.4 billion net deaths between 2030 and 2070). The 4.2 billion survivors in 2100 will still have access to 151 gb of reserve oil, and be consuming at a rate of .78 barrels of oil per person per year, which is about the same as modern-day Pakistan, or also, about the same as the global rate as of the year 1925.
b. The second alternate case is the “cold turkey” scenario, by which we decide, at once, to reduce consumption to some X amount, for the sake of future generations. The only question is, at various levels of X, what is the outcome. Note: Like all addicts, the withdrawl symptoms of this will be painful. I ran three cases: a 5 gb cut (the equivalent of 50% of OPEC production) a 10 gb cut (all OPEC production) and a 20 gb cut.
What was the outcome? Well, the only real difference was how soon the dieoff took place. Example: in the most extreme scenario, the population dropped from 6.3 billion to 5.3 billion between now and 2030, and another 1.19 billion between 2030 and 2070. The surviving population was 3.59 billion in 2100, but, would be able to consume oil at the rate of 1.19 barrels per capita per year, which gets us not quite as high as the Phillipines (1.59 b/per capita) but higher than India (.9 b/per capita).
Here is a summary table:
Code:
Scenario-2030 Pop--2030-2070-2100 Pop--2100 Reserves-2100 BPC
--------------------Crash---------------------------------------(gb)
Current Path-------7.2--1.143--4.39-----0----0
Uppsala Protocol--6.9---1.417--4.19---152--.78
5 Gb Cut-----------6.65-1.28----4.2----214--.92
10 Gb Cut---------6.25--1.18----4.13--316---1.08
20 Gb Cut---------5.33--1.19----3.59--682---1.19
Conclusions and discussion:
a. A lot of people are going to die, specifically between 2030 and 2070 (within the life span of one of today’s infants, if lucky) unless reserves actually do grow, and/or we find more oil and/or the “don’t worry, be happy” scenario described by the US-EIA and the IEA actually is true, and all is well, and all of this is a waste of time.
b. This may be not particularly noticeable by the people around at the time, since it will be as the result of a shorter life-expectancy and/or higher infant mortality, rather than some mass-fatality scenario.
c. The survivors will be treated to oil consumption at the same rate as today’s Bangladesh or Pakistan, if lucky, so it is possible for people to live at this level, but things are going to have to change, for some of us, but not for them. The current rate of per-capita consumption by the US is about 26 barrels per person, so the global “average” of 4.4 barrels per person is the Romaina level. The populations of India, (0.87) China (1.71) and Pakistan (00.80) (on average) will not notice a big difference in their daily lifestyle until about 2050.
d. I take back everything I said in other, earlier posts about conservation possibly being a way out of this. No amount of conservation will do anything except marginally increase the available oil consumption and reserves by 2100. Example: a 5 gb cold turkey cut in consumption today will result in an oil consumption equal to the rate of 1925 by the year 2100, but the 20 gb cut will only result in consumption equal to 1929. Probably not worth the bother, even if it were possible by government edict.
e. If life-span and lifestyle can be decoupled from oil consumption (this might be Heinberg’s “powerdown” scenario) people need not be unhappy, and the future need not be bleak, but, people are going to have to change. I agree with Heinberg, in this respect, on the basis of these results, it’s going to have to be up to the individual to adapt to this, because, even if implemented, no government effort of any kind will be enough to stop the problem. The population is already too big.
f. Mostly the kids of today, and their kids, are going to have to be the ones who will deal with reality.
g. Before anyone heads for the hills, we really do need more open, independently verifiable information about reserves, so we know what kind of trouble we are in. Until we get that, we will be driving blind.
Joined: Aug 18, 2004 Posts: 694 Location: SF Bay Area, Calif
Posted: Wed Dec 08, 2004 3:21 pm Post subject:
Quote:
As the supply of this abundant and efficient energy source disappears, it will have a direct negative impact on future population. (the “die off” per the Jay Hanson website).
The assumption of a "direct negative impact" is faulty. We have examples of countries with low energy usage (Cuba and Kerala), which yet have a surprisingly high standard of living. My guess is that they also have a relatively low birthrate.
We also have the paradox of many European countries using about half the per capita energy of the US, but still able to maintain a comparable standard of living.
My guess is that in America we are brainwashed to think that the present social arrangments are immutable. We don't believe that it is possible to organize society except by high-consumption, high energy systems. Thus, Americans seem prone to two conclusions:
1. We must embark on foreign wars to secure the petroleum to fuel our lifestyles.
2. Without that petroleum, chaos will ensue. Mad Max. Mass die-offs. The only solution is dictatorship or survivalism.
We can't see the solutions staring us in the face, just as the Mayans and Aztecs knew about the wheel, but never used it for transportation.
Joined: Aug 18, 2004 Posts: 694 Location: SF Bay Area, Calif
Posted: Wed Dec 08, 2004 7:47 pm Post subject:
Thanks for taking a comprehensive look at the situation, pup55. Your presentation makes it possible to examine our assumptions.
pup55 wrote:
e. If life-span and lifestyle can be decoupled from oil consumption (this might be Heinberg’s “powerdown” scenario) people need not be unhappy, and the future need not be bleak, but, people are going to have to change. I agree with Heinberg, in this respect, on the basis of these results, it’s going to have to be up to the individual to adapt to this, because, even if implemented, no government effort of any kind will be enough to stop the problem. The population is already too big.
You have pinpointed the key issue. While we (in the US) are fat and happy, we blithely dismiss the possibility of change. As bad times come, people's minds open to new possibilities. Consider the difference between the confidence and frivolity of 1927 and the despair and radicalism of 1933 (the worst year of the century for the US). Who in the Roaring Twenties would have predicted FDR and the New Deal a few years later?
We can expect big changes as Peak Oil unfolds. We shouldn't extrapolate blindly from current cultural trends.
pup55 wrote:
g. Before anyone heads for the hills, we really do need more open, independently verifiable information about reserves, so we know what kind of trouble we are in. Until we get that, we will be driving blind.
Yes and no. Greater oil reserves would seem to be a case similar to conservation; both would extend the oil that we do have. You disparaged conservation as not worth the bother, the effect being marginal in the long run. But it is not logical to disparge conservation and call the size of the oil reserves critical, since they both have the same effect.
I think that both are critical, in that knowledge of reserves bring home the magnitude of the problem, and conservation is critical to give us time to come to terms with the situation.
You are quite right, bart, about the conservation vs. reserves issue. I am looking at this from strictly a personal standpoint.
If you are middle aged, for example, and the IEA is right and we have another 50 years, plenty of time to take up golf or something. If you are sure that the peak is now, better do like Pops and move to the Ozarks and wait the thing out. I guess this is the typical boomer selfishness, and disregard for the species and planet (sorry).
If it makes you feel any better, if I knew for sure what the time scale was going to be, I would put steps into motion to take care of my own kids and grandkids later on, so as to do my duty as a mammal and try to get my genes passed on to the next generation.
From a society standpoint, you are right, the end game is the same either way.
As to the other issue, energy decline vs. life expectancy, I will check into this issue and comment later.
Joined: Aug 18, 2004 Posts: 694 Location: SF Bay Area, Calif
Posted: Thu Dec 09, 2004 1:21 am Post subject:
pup55 wrote:
I am looking at this from strictly a personal standpoint.
Ah, I understand now. The personal standpoint is important -- we all need to make our plans. I was talking with my wife about it tonight. If we were to die tomorrow it wouldn't be tragic; we've had full lives. So we don't see PO as personally threatening.
What worries us, as it does you, is the fate of our children, grandchildren, nieces and nephews. What kind of world will they inherit? We worry about the boys who have enlisted or are tempted to enlist, and the foreign wars they may fight in. Or the kids whose self-worth is tied up in expensive possessions -- how will they cope with a Depression?
So you're right. It makes sense to consider both the social and the personal aspects of PO.
Posted: Thu Dec 09, 2004 1:56 pm Post subject: cuba
The readers may judge whether Cuba is an appropriate guinea pig or not:
a. The period of extremely low energy was brief. Currently they are using 78% as much oil as they did before the rooskies went out of business, so only a 22% decrease. These guys have a little natural gas around, plus a small domestic oil industry, plus indications are they just cut back on driving mostly.
b. The 20% decrease caused a 40% decrease in GDP.
c. Their life expectancy is unusually high for a non-industrialized country, anyway, at about 76 currently similar to the US.
d. Their life expectancy grew 1.4 years during the period noted above. This compares to an average of 2.4 years for the other caribbean nations for the same period.
e. Fertility rate did, indeed fall sharply. What babies were born tended to do OK, though, the report says infant mortality % about the same as before they lost this percent of oil.
f. GDP started to rebound down there slightly, since then Fidel opened the door up to tourism a crack, and also they found a friend in Chavez of Venezuela who is taking care of them on oil.
g. The consumption rate is currently about 6.3 bbl/person compared to 8.1 before the “special period”. This is not necessarily the equivalent of the US going from 26 to 20. Arguments could be made either way as to which decrease would be the most serious.
The consumption data are surprising in light of the fact that GDP fell sharply, by almost 40%, during the “special period” in the early 1990s and then rose in the second half of the decade.
Since Moscow drastically cut economic assistance to Cuba as a result of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the island state’s domestic consumption has dropped from a peak of about 245,000 b/d in 1987 to as low as 110,000 b/d before it recovered to current levels of about 190,000 b/d.
As of 30 June 1996, the estimated population was 11,005,866, and the population density was 99.3 inhabitants per km2. The birth rate has declined steadily, reaching a low of 12.7 in 1996, with a reduction of about 30% for the decade. Fertility rates have also decreased. The general fertility rate dropped from 66.1 per 1,000 women aged 15–49 years in 1985 to 46.7 in 1996. At the same time, the group aged 60 and over continued to increase in absolute terms as well as proportionally and in 1996 made up 12.7% of the population.
The general fertility rate dropped from 66.1 per 1,000 women aged 15–49 years in 1985 to 46.7 in 1996. At the same time, the group aged 60 and over continued to increase in absolute terms as well as proportionally and in 1996 made up 12.7% of the population.
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