[shortonsense]

Yikes this is getting ugly.

What, someone who actually knows something about the industry noticing what the actual quality of web expert" knowledge is?

I vote we change the expert moniker on people who are bashed so expertly by REAL experts. Wheres Spike?

[shortonsense]

Even one short on sense can see that incidental spikes on the road to decline are to be expected.

Are you aware of any other oil regions that will compensate? We seem to be right on schedule.

Right on schedule for what? ANOTHER peak?

Besides, of what good is a 2% decline graph when the IEA has been claiming 6-9% is the norm?

[copious.abundance]

Tell me where the additional capacity beyond 2009 comes from? Is it deepwater GOM or Angola. Brazil. The Arctic?

Those have not panned out.

This is what happens when you ignore my posts: You remain uninformed about stuff you should know.

2 million barrels per day!



>>> Ze link <<<

Petrobras produces more than two million barrels per day
By Communiqué de presse - March 06, 09 at 18:30

Last Wednesday (03/04), Petrobras set yet another daily oil production record in Brazil: 2,012,654 barrels, a mark that surpasses the previous record, set on December 25 2007, by 12,420 barrels. This result is the outcome, mainly, of three new production platforms going on stream, in the past few months, in the Campos Basin (state of Rio de Janeiro): the P-51 and Cidade de Niterói, in the Marlim Sul field; and the P-53, in Marlim Leste. Another factor that contributed to this record was the good performance achieved by platforms P-52, which reached its peak production in the last quarter of 2008, and P-54, which has been increasing its production in the past few months. Both platforms are installed in the Roncador field, in the Campos Basin.

When they reach their peak production, the three new platforms will add 460,000 barrels per day to the installed domestic field capacity. The Cidade de Niterói vessel platform, which went online last month in the Marlim Sul field, in the Campos Basin (state of Rio de Janeiro), will be capable of producing 100,000 barrels per day (bpd). Additionally, platforms P-51, which started operating last January, and P-53, in December 2008, will contribute with up to 180,000 bpd each when in full production.

Onshore production also contributed to the daily record that has just been set. The average lifted from onshore fields has hovered around 230,000 barrels of oil per day, a volume that has been being maintained in the past few years thanks to the new technologies the company has been developing to increase the useful life of mature fields.

[...]

[copious.abundance]

Tell me where the additional capacity beyond 2009 comes from? Is it deepwater GOM or Angola. Brazil. The Arctic?

Those have not panned out.

This is what happens when you ignore my posts: You remain uninformed about stuff you should know.

She's fully up and running now! *throws party*
--> LINKY <--

BP Thunder Horse Production Ramping Up

HOUSTON, Dec. 18 /PRNewswire/ -- BP today announced that it has successfully started production from the third and fourth wells at the Thunder Horse field with production now in excess of 200,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boed), signalling the completion of commissioning and commencement of full operation. BP plans to start-up additional production from the Thunder Horse North field in the first half of 2009.

"The strong ramp-up of production from Thunder Horse is an important milestone as we continue to grow production from our strong portfolio of deepwater assets in the Gulf of Mexico," said Andy Inglis, BP's chief executive of Exploration and Production. "We have had to overcome significant challenges in developing and applying new technology to produce this ultra-deep, high-pressure, high-temperature field. The capability and technology we have developed will be critical for our next phase of offshore projects."

[...]

[copious.abundance]

Tell me where the additional capacity beyond 2009 comes from? Is it deepwater GOM or Angola. Brazil. The Arctic?

Those have not panned out.

This is what happens when you ignore my posts: You remain uninformed about stuff you should know.

I know they recently started up Jubarte in the Campos basin . . .

>> Rigzone <<<

Petrobras Kicks Off Production in Jubarte Field's Pre-Salt Layer
Petrobras Tuesday, September 02, 2008

Petrobras has kicked-off production of the first oil in the pre-salt layer, in the Jubarte field, in the Campos Basin, off the southern coast of Espirito Santo on September 2, 2008.

With this production, Petrobras will obtain knowledge that will help it develop the pre-salt reserves located in Espirito Santo and in other places off the Brazilian coast. To adjust to the characteristics of the light oil found in the pre-salt (30 degrees API), it was necessary to make several small adaptations to the platform's processing plant which, with the completion of well 1-ESS-103A and its interconnection to FPSO JK (P-34), involved investments in the order of some R$50 million. Production begins with a Long-Duration Test (LDT) to observe how pre-salt oil behaves, both in the reservoir and in the platform’s process plant. The LDT is expected to last six months to a year.

[...]

You need to quit getting all your information from Colin Campbell and start reading Rigzone!

[Narz]

Wow, I haven't seen a thread about peak oil in awhile.

[copious.abundance]

Oh yeah, and one more, because I just . . . can't . . . resist.

Tell me where the additional capacity beyond 2009 comes from? Is it deepwater GOM or Angola. Brazil. The Arctic?

Those have not panned out.

North Dakota is now producing 200K bpd - same as Thunder Horse!



It's a gusher!

[AgentR]

Other than mildly entertaining.. this is what?

Given the nature of the beasty, we probably won't know when the peak was until 10 years after the fact.

[sjn]

It's easy to discredit people by pointing out specific predictions and presenting their opinion at the time as some declaration of truth. Nobody knew (or indeed knows) the state of Saudi oil production, except maybe the Saudi's. Even then, given the belief the UK North Sea production was projected to rise through 2000 and beyond with transparent data it's pretty easy to let belief get in the way of an objective evaluation of the situation. That's what this whole disagreement boils down to, both sides believe they are being objective, but belief itself is a subjective qualility. There's a perception that each side is stating things as fact, when in fact there's great uncertainty, especially in specific numbers at specific times.

What seems to be missed is pstar's and indeed my own view that the systemic feedbacks operate an order higher than any single country's gross output, or any of OF2s rapid depletion frac jobs. All this extra oil in the last 7 years has not been converted into actual productive economic activity, it's been barely sustaining itself (on a net energy and economic basis). This means going forward, any increase in gross production is counter productive, this includes converting ecologically balanced and/or food producing land into unsustainable biomass->fuel ag.

[JohnDenver]

JD you have misrepresented Hirsch. His mitigation includes two components-conservation, specifically in the automobile, truck, and airplane fleets, and also development of improved and alternative liquid fuel sources such as heavy oil and oil sands, gas-to-liquids, fuel switching to electricity, and hydrogen.

You fabricate so much incorrect crap it's ridiculous.

The Hirsch plan is comprised of the following 5 elements. Numbers in parentheses indicate the amount of fuel produced after a 10 year crash effort:

1) Passenger car fuel-efficiency (1 mbd)
2) Heavy oil/Oil sands (8 mbd)
3) Coal liquefaction (5 mbd)
4) Enhanced oil recovery (3 mbd)
5) Gas-to-liquids (2 mbd)

Out of a total of 19mbd, only 1mbd (5%) comes from efficiency. And even that could hardly be called conservation because Hirsch assumes that people will still drive in a completely business-as-usual fashion, in vehicles with marginally higher mpg. My original characterization of the Hirsch plan was correct. Conservation plays no role in it.

Hirsch's plan has no provision for conservation in the truck/airplane fleets, or fuel switching to electricity/hydrogen. You just fabricated that part. Like you fabricated Robert Rapier's advocacy of biofuels. And my vegetarianism. You're an old man. Out of touch. You're developing pus-filled voids in your brain.

[RobertRapier]

I don't believe expertise is required.

This is the sort of thinking that led you to accept faulty analyses in the first place. Some amount of understanding is required in order to interpret the data. Your attitude is the same as I have seen from so many Creationists I have debated: “Sure, I am an electrical engineer, but no particular expertise is required to see that evolution is hogwash.”

Here is a sampling of what you missed. This was debated over at TOD, when someone tried to point out that the bumps were due to Manifa, Khursaniyah, Khurais, etc. coming online. The problem is that the bumps in production occurred before various projects came online. This bit was missed by many who assumed that bumps must be due to projects. They had concluded that Saudi had peaked, therefore the only way they could raise production was with new projects. It is of some interest to go back and look at some of the forecasts by certain TOD posters for Saudi production and see how far off the mark they were. Stuart forecast Saudi production at the end of 2009 at 6.5 million bpd and falling. Ace made similar forecasts, as did Westexas (his Saudi HL, updated through 2008, is at this point looking pretty shaky). The question is, “Why were they so far off, and why did you support those forecasts?” Because you didn’t have the expertise to sort wheat from chaff.

Something else to consider. Year by year depletion marches on. I often hear that all of the world’s big fields are tapped out. Why then hasn’t Saudi fallen off the cliff? Because they have lots of smaller fields that have been more than compensating. I am not one who believes that when Ghawar peaks, the world has peaked. I forget what the exact number was, but I think it is something like 19 out of 20 of the world’s megafields have peaked; Ghawar still being somewhat uncertain. But while the other 19 were peaking, world oil production rose by something like 20 million barrels. That is probably completely counter-intuitive to someone who doesn’t understand the big picture. But the world does not live and die entirely on the megafields.

Here is another area in which lack of expertise led you astray. Here’s one way I was certain that those HL ‘studies’ looking at Saudi were in error. When the Saudis started cutting production back in 2005, I did a couple of analyses. In 1982, Saudi Arabia stopped allowing their oil and gas data to be scrutinized. Prior to that, outsiders had some access to information on their reserves. When that accessibility was shut down, Saudi proven oil reserves were estimated to be 164.60 billion barrels. I have yet to find a challenge to this number. It seems to be accepted that this number does represent their reserves in 1982. However, in 1990 they mysteriously raised their reserve estimate by 90 billion barrels. Since the data are now hidden from public view, there is obviously a great deal of skepticism regarding this new estimate.

So, I started with the assumption that the 1982 estimate of 164.60 billion barrels was correct, and then I just subtracted Saudi production since then. I calculated their total production since 1982 as 69 billion barrels, leaving 95 billion barrels of reserves. This approach would imply either that their 1982 reserves were overstated, or that the HL models showing Saudi Arabia at 70 billion barrels remaining (or 75% depleted) are in error. Since I can’t find any legitimate challenge to the 1982 number, and because we have experience with reserves growth (see next paragraph), it seemed far more likely that the latter was the case.

We know that reserves sometimes legitimately grow, and new discoveries take place. In 1982, U.S. reserves were 27.858 billion barrels. In 2005, U.S. reserves were 21.757 billion barrels. So the U.S. drew down reserves by 6 billion barrels. Guess how much oil we produced in the interim? 56.9 billion barrels. Thus, in the past 24 years the U.S. has produced 57 billion barrels of oil and pulled reserves down by only 6 billion barrels. The reason is that there were discoveries that took place over the past 24 years. The same will hold true in Saudi.

Second thing, as I was pointing out, the comments from the Saudis for why they were dropping production in 2005 were backed up by OECD inventory data. Inventories were high and rising. Their comments were met by derision in many quarters, as some sloppy analysts insisted (with the only evidence being their conviction that Saudi had peaked) they were lying to cover up the fact that Ghawar had peaked. And if I put myself in the position of managing Saudis reserves, their moves are consistent with the moves I would have made: They were cutting production because they could see inventories rising, and wanted to avoid a glut and subsequent price crash. Where they did make a mistake is that when inventories pulled down, they were too slow to raise production, leading to much speculation that they couldn’t; this helped fuel runaway prices, which ultimately crushed demand. Had they moved in time, they could have headed off oil at over $100 a barrel before it did so much damage to the economy. (I am a fan of higher oil prices, as I want to see consumption reined in. But that was too much, too quickly.)

Bottom line? I don’t think Saudi has geologically peaked, but so long as the economy stays in the dumps they won’t be called upon to demonstrate it. But make no mistake about it: All indications are that they are still sitting on quite a lot of oil. It is tough to make a solid case that they are setting on less than 100 billion barrels still. Their production isn’t going to fall off of a cliff any time soon.

Note for those who are unfamiliar with my position: None of this means that I think we should trust the Saudis to continue supplying us with cheap oil. Our energy security is far too important to leave in the hands of countries whose oil reserves are not open, and who could cut us off at any moment. But we will remain dependent upon them for the foreseeable future, so I think it is very important to understand what is going on there.

RR

[RobertRapier]

It's easy to discredit people by pointing out specific predictions and presenting their opinion at the time as some declaration of truth.

That’s just the thing. Pstarr was using those predictions as a declaration of truth, and trying to discredit me at the time with those declarations. I think it’s fair game to point out that those predictions failed to materialize – and I was arguing at the time that they would - but more importantly understand why they failed to materialize so we can get a better understanding of what oil production is likely to look like in the future. Plus, continued failed predictions are why peak oilers are looked at as sort of a cult: They tie their predictions to specific dates, and every time those dates are discredited they lose credibility.

Nobody knew (or indeed knows) the state of Saudi oil production, except maybe the Saudi's.

But some projections are more comprehensive than others. See my response above. Simply going back to Saudi reserves when the books were open will tell you that those HL predictions can’t be correct. Yet pstarr was a big fan of that methodology as an indicator that Saudi had peaked. As I have said before, I think it’s basically garbage. It doesn’t work reliably in real time to predict a peak. And I can tell you that Stuart Staniford, whose views pstarr endorsed, came around to that view by the time he stopped posting. You can e-mail him and ask him. He credited me for exposing the flaws in the methodology (which some are still clinging to).

What seems to be missed is pstar's and indeed my own view that the systemic feedbacks operate an order higher than any single country's gross output, or any of OF2s rapid depletion frac jobs.

That’s not missed, it is just a different discussion.

RR

[copious.abundance]

And as for your Bakken. It's all a fracted bubble that will burst in several years. But you knew that right?

No, I don't know it. And neither do you. You've got a lot of guts to make yet another prediction in a thread where everyone is pointing out to you how bad your predictions have been.

[AAA]

And as for your Bakken. It's all a fracted bubble that will burst in several years. But you knew that right?

Will you please explain based on geology or technology your reasons for this?

[shortonsense]

Oh yeah, and one more, because I just . . . can't . . . resist.

Tell me where the additional capacity beyond 2009 comes from? Is it deepwater GOM or Angola. Brazil. The Arctic?

Those have not panned out.

North Dakota is now producing 200K bpd - same as Thunder Horse!



It's a gusher!

Peaks 25 years apart?

Wow....so.....if we just got around to peaking in 2008 ( again ) then I suppose when the economy recovers by 2033 we'll be right back where we started!!!