Dr. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National Intelligence
at the 2008 INSA Analytic Transformation Conference
Orlando, Florida September 4, 2008 Evening Keynote Speech
from Pg 20-26 http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20080904_speech.pdf
One of the key assumptions or projections that we have used in sort of looking at the world going out 15, 17 years – the first assumption is that the process of globalization that we have witnessed over a couple of decades will both continue and continue to generate both greater wealth and greater inequality. But the gap between rich and poor – internationally, regionally, and intra-nationally will grow – [between] the elites and the disadvantaged.
A second is that the U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished over this period of time. That the truly anomalous situation that has existed since World War II … of the overwhelming dominance that the United States has enjoyed in the international system in military, political, economic, and arguably, cultural arenas is eroding and will erode at an accelerating pace with the partial exception of military.
[another] factor in the mix – the effects of climate change. Directed by the Congress to do a study – we did a National Intelligence Assessment of the geopolitical effects of climate change – that looked out to 2030. One of the points it makes is that there is absolutely nothing that can be done between now and 2030 that will change the projected impact on climate change. That die was cast years or decades ago. It doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do things to affect the period of time thereafter. But at least the argument here is that the changes in sea level, the changes in temperature, the impact on agriculture, the impact on water availability, the impact that comes from melting in the Arctic and opening up resources and extending growing seasons in some places, and shortening them in others. That is going to happen.
All we can begin to do now is prepare to mitigate those impacts. Now, what are those impacts? Water shortages. As far as I know, there is no disagreement about the projection of strains in water in particular regions. Regions that include the already unstable Middle East, that include China – that the projections of continued 10 percent growth for China and all that that means. Ignore the fact that it has severe water problems now. And they get much, much worse by 2015 or 2020. Why does it matter? Orders of magnitude in a North China plain that is running out of water because they are depleting the underground aquifers through millions of tube wells drilled in the 1960s, produces the food for 400 million people. Think about the difficulty of scrounging up in the international system the food for 17 or 18 million North Koreans, for a few tens of millions on the Horn of Africa. Any number – any activity put down in the Chinese context, and you have got one hell of a problem. And that is going to happen. This isn’t in the maybe category. This is in the for-real category.
And even with the climate change, it is not a good time to live in the Southwest because it will run out of water and looks like the Dust Bowl. It is not a good time to be along the Atlantic seaboard, particularly in the South because of the projected increase and intensity and severity and frequency of severe weather – more hurricanes, more serious storms, and so forth. And kind of practical problems – I think the number is 63 military installations that are in danger of being flooded by storm surges. The number of nuclear power plants that are so similarly vulnerable is almost as high.
And finally is energy security. ... Any number times 2.4 billion – India plus China – is a big number, whether it is kilowatts or barrels of oil – with its impact on oil prices, on greenhouse gases, which, oh, yeah, reifies and ramifies, extends into climate change dimensions.
What does this all mean for this administration, the next administration, any administration? As we look out a few years, we’re probably going to be playing with fewer cards. The face value of those cards will be diminished. There will be more players in the game. There will be more conflicting interests, interests that will be, end of the day if you looked at them objectively, legitimate interests that will be in conflict. There’s no overwhelming enemy as Soviet-led international communism, an existential threat to our way of life. There’s a whole bunch of – to borrow Jim Woolsey’s – a lot of snakes out there, no more dragons.
How do we get across to those who will be moving into positions of authority and influence in Washington how complex the world is; how hazardous off-the-shelf, knee-jerk, visceral kinds of fixes, solution, attitudes are, and that we just have to accept that we are viewed by the rest of the world differently that we were for most of the last six decades? It’s going to be a whole lot harder to deal with a whole lot more problems that are going to be much more interconnected than ever in our past.
To deal with that nexus of problems you better have Russia specialists, and Caspian region specialists, and Iran specialists, and Iraq specialists, and military and energy and economic and demographic, and on and on and on. And if that array of experts isn’t consulted, isn’t sharing information, isn’t talking with one another and talking beyond the confines of the community, we will fail.
